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On marshalling the assets of both partnership and individual estates, under sepa-ate assignments for the benefit of creditors, the partnership creditors are not entitled,
after exhausting the partnership assets, to resort to the individual assets until after
the individual creditors' claims have been satisfied.
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RUNYON, Chancellor.-John 0. Bennett and James M. Andrews were, on or about the 10th of February 1876, partners in
business in Phillipsburg. On that day they made an assignment
under the Assignment Act, for the equal benefit of their creditors,
to the complainant, William M. Davis. Five days after the making
of that assignment Andrews made an assignment, under the Act,
for the equal benefit of his creditors, to the complainant and Joseph
Howell, and about the same time Bennett made a like assignment
to Sylvester A. Comstock and Charles F. Fitch. The partnership
estate will pay a dividend of only about eleven per cent. of the
partnership debts. Most of the partnership creditors have put in
their claims under the assignment of Andrews, and claim and
insist upon a proportionate participation with his individual creditors therein as to so much of their claims as may not be paid out
of the partnership estate, and they threaten the complainant and
his co-assignee of Andrews's estate with legal proceedings if their
demand be not complied with. The complainant therefore comes
into this court for protection and instructions as to his duty in the
premises. His co-assignee, Howell, is a creditor of Andrews's estate,
and he is made a defendant.
The question presented has been often discussed, and, though
there exists some contrariety of judicial determination upon it,
must be considered as settled by the great weight of authority.
The rule is laid down in the text-books that joint debts are entitled to priority of payment out of the joint estate, and separate
debts out of the separate estate: Story's Eq. Jur., sect. 675;
Snell's Prin. of Eq. 419; Story on Part., sect. 376; Kent's Com.
64, 65; Parsons on Part. 480. And though the propriety of the
rule has been often and persistently questioned on the ground that
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it is a violation of principle, and devoid of equity, and was originally adopted from considerations of convenience' only, and in
bankruptcy cases, and not on *principles of general equity, yet it
is so firmly established that it must be regarded as a fixed rule of
equity. Its history is so well known, and has been so often stated,
that it is profitless to repeat it. It was declared in 1715, in Ex
parte Crowder, 2 Vern.706; it was affirmed by Lord HARDWICKE,
and though Lord THURLOW refused to follow it, it was restored by
Lord LOUGHBOROUGH and followed by Lord ELDON, and it has
existed ever since in the English chancery. It has an exception
where there is no joint estate and no solvent partner. But where
there is any joint estate the rule is to be applied. That part of
the rule which gives the joint creditors a preference upon the joint
estate has been repeatedly recognised in this state : Cammack v.
Johnson, 1 Gr. Oh. 163; Matlacek v. James, 2 Beas. 126; Mittnight v. Smith, 2 C. E. Gr. 259; Scull v. Alter, 1 Iarr. 147 ;
Curtis v. Hollingshead,2 Gr. 402; Brown v. Bissett, 1 Zab. 46;
i nford v. Linford, 4 Dutch. 118. In Scull v. Alter the Supreme
Court recognised the rule in all its parts.

Chief Justice HORN-

BLowER, by whom the opinion of the court was delivered (the

question arose under an assignment under the Assignment Act,
and was the same as is presented in this case), said: "But if it is
an assignment not only of the partnership effects and property of
the firm of Carhart & Britton, but also an individual and several
assignment by them of their respective and several estates, then
it. must be treated as such. The estates and debts must be marshalled; the partnership effects applied in the first instance to the
partnership debts; the effects of Carhart applied in the first instance
to the payment of his separate debts, and in like manner the effects
of Britton to the payment of debts due from him individually."
In Connecticut the rule is not followed, and that part of it which
gives the separate creditors a preference upon the separate estate
has been repudiated: Camp v. Grant, 21 Conn. 41. It has been
renudiated also in certain other states; Bardwell v. Perry, 19
Vt 292; Emanuel v. Bird, 19 Ala. 596. But the doctrine is
recognised elsewhere, and has been established after thorough discussion and careful consideration. In Wilder v. Keeler, 3 Paige
167, Chancellor WALWORTH, after a full discussion of the subject,
gives the sanction of his weighty opinion to the rule as a doctrine
of equity. He says: "In the case now under consideration there
was, at the death of G. F. Lush, a large joint fund belonging to
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the partnership, out of which the joint creditors were entitled to a

priority of payment, and out of which several of the joint creditors who have come in under this decree, have actually secured a
portion of their debts. Nothing but an unbending rule of law
should, under such circumstances, induce the court to permit them
to come in for the residue of their debts, ratably, with the separate
creditors. The amount of the fund which will remain after paying the separate creditors being a fund which could not be reached
at law by the joint creditors whose remedy survived against the
surviving partner alone, must be considered in the nature of equitable assets, and must be distributed among the joint creditors, upon
the principle of this court that equality is equity." The doctrine
was recognised in Morgan v. Skidmore, 55 Barb. 263. In Pennsylvania in Bell v. Newman, 5 S. & R. 78, 91, 92, GIBSON (afterwards Chief Justice), in a dissenting opinion, strongly supports
the rule as one founded on the most substantial justice. In Black's
Appeal, 44 Penn. St. 503, and again in McCormack's Appeal, 55
Penn. St. 252, the doctrine is completely recognised and affirmed.
In South Carolina, in Woddrop v. Price, 3 Dessaus. 203; Tunno
v. Trezevant, 2 Id. 264, and Hall v. Hall, 2 McCord's Ch.
269, the doctrine was held to be a doctrine of equity. In Massa.
chusetts it is established by statute. In Murrill v. -eill, 8 How.
414, it is recognised by the Supreme Court of the United States.
The objection that is always pressed as the conclusive argument
against it is, that partnership debts are several as well as joint, and
it is urged that therefore the partnership creditor has an equal
claim upon the individual estate with the separate creditor. But
it is beyond dispute that in equity the former has a preferred claim
upon the partnership estate. To accord to him an equal claim as
to the balance of his debt, which the partnership assets may not be
sufficient to satisfy, with the individual creditor, would be to give
him an advantage to which he is not equitably entitled. If he
obtains a legal lien on the separate estate, he will not be deprived
of it: Wisham v. Lippincott, 1 Stock. 353 ; Bandolph v. Daly,
1 C. E. Gr. 313; National Bank v. Sprague, 5 Id. 13; Howell
v. Teel, 2 Stew. Eq. 490. But if he has no such lien, and the
assets are to be marshalled in equity, that same equitable doctrine by which the partnership assets are devoted in the first place
to the payment of his debt to the exclusion of the separate creditor,
and to which he is indebted for the preference, will, in like manner
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and for like reason, give the latter preference upon the separate
property. Such was the view of Chancellor KENT. He says:
"So far as the partnership property has been acquired by means
of partnership debts, those debts have, in equity, a priority
of claim to be discharged, and the separate creditors are only
entitled in equity to such payment from the surplus of the joint
fund after satisfaction of the joint debts. The equity of the
rule, on the other hand, equally requires that the joint creditors
should only look to the surplus of the separate estates of the partners after payment of the separate debts. It was a principle of
the Roman law, and it has been acknowledged in the equity jurisprudence of Spain, England and the United States, that partnership debts must be paid out of the partnership estate, and private
and separate debts out of the private and separate estate of the
individual partner :" 3 Kent's Com. 64, 65. The obvious infirmity of the objection to the rule is, that it leaves out of consideration the fact that it is to equity that the joint creditor is indebted
for his preference. It is also urged that instead of the rule, it
would be more equitable to require the joint creditor to have recourse to the partnership property before allowing him to participate in the separate estate, on the equitable ground that he has two
funds for the payment of his debt, while the separate creditor has
but one; but the rule as established is a rule of justice and equity.
Ithas for its basis the presumption that joint debts have been contracted on the credit of the joint estate, and separate debts'on that
of the separate estate. It has the weight of great authority and
long establishment, notwithstanding persistent objection and some
fluctuation, and it is based on equitable principles. Sound policy
is in its favor. Though there may be, as there is in the case of all
such rules, instances in which it 'viorks unsatisfactorily, yet that on
the whole, and as a rule, it has not operated unjustly, is evidenced
by the fact that it has existed so long (Ex parte Crowder was decided in 1715), notwithstanding opposition, and that in Massachusetts, at least, it has, in the face of the opposition referred to, been
established by legislative authority, and that, too, as lately as 1888.
In this state it has, as has been shown, the sanction of our judicial
tribunals, and it is too firmly established to be disturbed. It is
true that in Wisham v. Lippincott, 1 Stock. 353, 356, the chancellor expressed strong doubt of its correctness, as a general rule;
but in the other cases before cited, both previous and subsequent,
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the rule has been recognised without any expression of disapprobation or dissatisfaction.
There will be a decree that the joint assets be first applied to the
payment of the joint debts, and the separate assets to the separate
debts, and that the joint creditors may participate in any surplus
of the separate assets which may remain after payment of the separate debts. The costs of the parties will be paid out of the funds
represented by the complainant-the partnership estate-and Andrews's estate in equal shares.
The settlement of debts is a subject
which is rendered complicated in the law
by the relation of partnership. It is a
mere truism to say that the subject is a
very important one, so general is the
relationship, and so extensive the dealings of persons who stand in that relationship. It is hoped that the following
review of the authorities will not be
without interest as recalling the general
principles which control in such cases.
1. The corpus of the effects of a partnership is joint property. Neither partner
separately has anything in that corpus,
but the interest of each is only his share,
in accordance with the partnership agreement, of what remains after the partnership debts are paid and the accounts are
taken: West v. SkTip, 1 Ves. 239;
Fox v. Hanbury, Cowp. 445 ; Taylor v.
Felds, 4 Ves. 396 ; Witter v. Richards,
10 Conn. 37 ; Beecher v. Stevens, 43 Id.
587 ; Pierce v. Jackson, 6 Mass. 243;
Place v. Sweetzer, 16 Ohio 142; Hurley
v. Walton, 63111. 260 ; Taft v. Schwamb,
80 Id. 289 ; Williams v. Gage, 49 Miss.
777 ; Gaines v. Coney, 51 Id. 323;
California Furniture Co. v. Halsey, 54
Cal. 315, 317 ; Matlock v. Matlock, 5
Ind. 403 ; Swallow v. nTomas, 15 Kans.
69 ; Hall, Admr., v. Clagett, 48 Md.
223; Menagh v. Thitwell, 52 N. Y.
146, 158; Meily v. Wood, 71 Penn.
St. 488; Staats v. Bristou, 73 N. Y.
264.
2. The partners have a lien on the
partnership property for the payment of
the partnership debts, and for the surplus
VoL. XXIX.- 59

due to each partner after the settlement of
the partnership liabilities ; but the creditors, as such, have no lien upon the
partnership property, and must work out
their rights through the equities of the
partners: Rice v. Barnard,20 Vt. 479 ;
Freeman v. Stewart, 41 Miss. 139 ; Sigler v. Knox County Bank, 8 Ohio St.
511 ; Hawk Eye Woollen Mills v. Conklin, 26 Iowa 422 ; O'Bannon v. Miller, 4
Barb. 25; Ransom v. Van Deventer, 41
Barb. 313 ; Menaghv. Whitwell, 52 N. Y.
146; Cope's Appeal, 39 Penn. St 284;
Houseal's Appeal, 45 Id. 485 ; Foster v.
Barnes, 81 Id. 377 ; Day v. Wetherby,
29 Wis. 363 ; Fain v. Jones, 3 Head
308; Case v. Beauregard, 99 U. S.
119 ; Campbell v. MAullett, 2 Swanston's
Ch. 550, 570; Ex parte Ruffin, 6 Yes.
119:

3. The principle is well settled thut
because of this lien of the partners, the
firm's debts must be paid out of the
firm's assets before the personal debts of
the individual members of the firm can
be paid therefrom: Pease v. Rush, 2
Minn. 112; Chase v. Steel, 9 Cal. 64;.
Bullock v. Hubbard, 23 Id. 501 ; Lucas
v. Atwood, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 378; Bridge
v. McCullough's Admr., 27 Ala. 661 ;
Camp v. Mayer, 47 Ga. 414 ; I7lley v.
Phelps, 18 Conn. 300 ; Clark v. Allee,
3 Har. (Del.) 80; Conant v. Frary,
49 Ind. 530; Cox v. Russell, 44 Iowa
560 ; Roberts v. Oldham, 63 N. C. 298 ;
French v. Lovejoy, 12 N. H. 458; Bass
v. Estill, 50 Miss. 300; Williams v.
Gage, 49 Id. 777 ; Phelps v. McNeely,
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66 Mo. 558 ; Frow, Jacobs 6- Co2's Estate,
73 Penn. St. 459 ; Carper v. Hawkins,
8 W. Va. 291 ; Converse v. McKee, 14
Texas 30; Johnson v. King, 6 Hum.
233; Christian v. Ellis, 1 Gratt. 396;
Washburn v. Bellows Falls Bank, 19
Vt. 278.
4. The right of creditors to be first
paid out of the firm's assets being a
right derived through the equities of the
partners and dependent upon these
equities, it follows that if the partners
waive their equities and consent to the
appropriation of the firm's assets to the
payment of a personal debt of an individual member of the firm, no one can
raise objection thereto, the firm being
solvent: Schmidlapp v. Currie, 55 Miss.
597 ; s. c., 18 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.)
108; National Bank v. Sprague, 20 N.
J. Eq. 14; Carter v. Beaman, 6 Jones
Law 44 ; Marks v. Hill, 15 Gratt. 400 ;
Mayer v. Clark, 40 Ala. 259; Beeves
v. Ayers, 38 Ill. 418; Jones v. Lusk, 2
Met. (Ky.) 362.
(a) But without the assent of the copartners the partnership assets cannot
be applied to the individual debt of one
of the members: Todd v. Lorah, 75
Penn. St. 155; Corwin v. Suydam, 24
Ohio St. 209 ; Atkin v. Berry, I B. J.
Lea 91; Perry v. Butt, 14 Ga. 699;
Filley v. Phelps, 18 Conn. 300; Lanier
v. McCabe, 2 Fla. 32 ; Furman v.
Fisher, 4 Coldw. 626 ; Smith v. Andrews, 49 Ill. 28; Caldwell v. Scott, 54
N. H. 414; Nlanagan v. Alexander, 50
Mo. 50; Ross v. Henderson, 77 N. C.
172; Blodgett v. Sleeper, 67 Me. 500;
Williams v. Barnett, 10 Kans. 455 ;
Hamilton v. Hodges, 30 La. Ann. 1290.
(b) When the separate credit or of a
partner takes partnership property in
payment of his debt, knowing at the
time that it is partnership property, he
acquires no rights therein as against the
partnership, and it may be recovered
back, the copartners not having assented
to such an appropriation: Mix v. Mussy,
28 Conn. 190; Moriarty v. Bailey, 46

Id. 592; Major v. Hawkes, 12 1ll. 298,
Ross v. Henderson, 77 N. C. 172;
Daniel v. Daniel, 9 B. Monr. 196.
(c) And the partnership property may
be recovered back, although the creditor
did not know that the funds belonged to
the partnership, provided he has parted
with no security which he previously
held: Moriarty v. Bailey, 46 Conn.
592. See, too, Acdey v. Staehlin, 56
Mo. 558.
(d) But the doctrine is generally laid
down more broadly, to the effect that
the transfer passes the title as against
the partnership and its creditors, provided the separate creditor acted in good
faith and without notice that the property belonged to the partnership : Locke
v. Lewis, 124 Mass. 1 ; Wiley v. Allen,
26 Ga. 568.
(e) The knowledge and assent of the
partners to the application of partnership
property to the payment of the separate
debt must be clearly shown: Wise v.
Copley, 36 Ga. 508. See Darling v.
March, 22 Me. 184 ; Blodgett v. Sleeper,
67 Id. 500; Keith v. Kbink, 47 III. 272.
(f) It has been held that partnership
assets cannot be applied, even with consent of copartners, to the payment of the
individual debt of a partner, if the firm
is insolvent. The reason upon which the
principle is based, being that insolvent
partners are to be considered as holding
their joint property for the benefit of their
joint creditors, and that a misappropriation is to be deemed in fraud of the implied trust. That a division by partners
of copartnership assets under such circumstancrs, and a transfer of such assets
by individual partners in payment of
individual debts, is a fraud upon firm
creditors, and it is, therefore, held that
such transfer is invalid until the property
comes to the hands of a bond-fide purchaser for a new and valuable consideration: Menagh v. Whitwell, 52 N. Y.
146, 153, 161, 162; Ransom v. Van
Deventer, 41 Barb. 307. And see Burtus v. Tisdall, 4 Barb. 580; Wilson v.
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Robertson, 21 N. Y. 587; Saloy v. Albredht, 17 La. Ann. 75 ; Flackv.Charron,
29 Md. 311. See, too, Schmidlapp v.
Currie, 55 Miss. 597; s. c., Am. Law
Reg. (N. S.) 108 ; where it is said that
an appropriation to pay individual debts
may be made with assent of copartners,
where the firm "is neither bankrupt nor
contemplating bankruptcy," and where
there is a bondfide consideration therefor.
But in M]farks
v. Hill, 15 Gratt. 400, it
is asserted that such appropriation may
be made, although the partnership is unable to pay its firm debts.
5. By the transfer of the joint property to is co-partner, and taking his
personal contract and security for the
payment of the joint debts, the partner
loses his lien, the agreement of the copartner being substituted therefor, and
the property becomes the separate property of such co-partner, who is entitled
to use it as such: Ex parte Bit ifn, 6
Vesey 119; Howe v. Lawrence, 9 Cush.
555. 558; Dinon v. Hazard, 32 N. Y.
65 ; kfnagh v. Whitwell, 52 N. Y. 146,
160 ; Iapgood v. Cornwell, 48 Ill.
64 ;
Case v. Beauregard, 99 U. S. 119 ; Kimbah v. Thompson, 13 Met. 283; Robb v.
Mudqe, 14 Gray 534; Baker's Appeal,
21 Penn. St. 76 ; lVilcox v. Kellogg, 11
Ohio 394; Vesper v. Kramer, 31 N. J.
Eq. 420; Andrews v. Mann, 31 Miss.
322 ; Rankin v. Jones, 2 Jones (N. C.)
Eq. 169 ; City of Maquoketa v. Willey,
35 Iowa 323; Smith v. Edwards,7 Hum.
106 ; Allen v. Centre Valley Co., 21
Conn. 130; Croone v. Bivens, 2 Head
89. But see Rogers v. Nichols, 20
Tex. 726; Tenney v. Johnson, 43 N. H.
144; Phelps v. McNeely, 66 Mo. 558;
Flanagan v. Alexander, 50 Id. 50; Succession of Beer v. Goodman, 12 La. Ann.
698.
6. As partnership creditors have no lien
in their own right upon the partnership
property, but work out their preference
solely through the equity of the partners,
do the partnership creditors lose their
rights to a priority, supposing each part-

ner transfers his interest to a third
party? For instance, A., B. & C. are
in partnership. The partnership property amounts to $300,000, and the partnership debts to $150,000. A. sells out
his interest to D., who would take $50,000, as the partnership creditors still had
a lien through the equities of the remaining partners. But before the creditors
have exercised their right to levy on the
firm's property, the interests of B. and C.
are sold toE. Now, it has been claimed
that at this point each partner has lost
his lien, and that the lien of the partners
being gone, the right of the partnership
creditors to the payment of their debts
out of the property was gone also. That
being the case, D.'s share in the property
would be at once changed from $50,000
to $100,000. Mr. Justice Ginsozz was
of the opinion in Coover's Appeal, 29
Penn. St. 9, that by this last sale, the
property of the firm would be relieved
from partnership debts, and that the share
first sold would be at once changed from
an interest in the surplus to a share in
the corpus of the property free from debts.
There was nothing in the case which
made necessary the expression of such
an opinion, and it must be regarded as
an obiter dictum. But the question came
up fairly in New York not long since in
Menagh v. Whitwell, 52 N. Y. 146, and
a conclusion reached contrary to the
opinion expressed in Coover's Appeal.
It was held that the equity of the partners was not lost, and that the property
was still subject to the payment of the
partnership debts. The question is certainly a nice one, and future adjudications in reference to it will be awaited
with interest. But the rule seems to be
settled in Pennsylvania in accordance
with the opinion expressed in Coover's
Appeal, that when the partners have lost
dominion of the partnership property by
a sale of their interests, the equity of
creditors whose liens had not actually
attached is thereby destroyed : McNutt
v. Strayhorn, 39 Penn. St. 269 ; citing
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Doner v. Stauffer, I P. & W. 198;
Kelly's Appeal, 4 Harris 59; Baker's
Appeal, 9 Id. 77 ; Coover's Appeal, supra.
And in this connection the opinion of
Justice STRONG, as expressed recently in
Case v. Beauregard, 99 U. S. 119, is
important. "If, before the interposition of the court is asked," so he says,
"the property has ceased to belong to
the partnership, if by a bona fide transfer it has become the several property
either of one partner or of a third person, the equities of the partners are extinguished, and consequently the derivative equities of the creditors are at an
end. It is, therefore, always essential
to any preferential right of the creditors
that there shall be property owned by
the partnership when the claim for preference is sought to be enforced."
7. It has been held that where a partnership is composed of tvo or more firms,
the creditors of one of the firms are entitled to a preference in payment of their
debts, over creditors of the whole partnership: Bullock v. Hubbard, 23 Cal.
495.
8. But where the same partners carry
on the same business at different places
under different partnership names, the
creditors holding claims nominally against
one firm are not entitled to be first paid
out of the assets held under that firm
name, but the assets of both nominal
firms are equally applicable to the payment of all the creditors of both: In re
Vetterlein, 5 Benedict 311 ; In re Willams, 3 Wood 493. See Buckner v.
Calcote, 28 Miss. 432, 586, 587, to same
effect.
9. And partnership debts must be paid
before the debts of a former partnership,
of which one of the present firm was a
member: Camp v. Mayer, 47 Ga. 414;
Hurlburt v. Johnson, 74 Ill.-64.
10. In equity, the real property acquired by a partnership for partnership
purposes is regarded as personal estate
so far as payment of partnership debts is
concerned, and also as regards the ad-

justment of all partnership rights: Little
v. Snedecor, 52 Ala. 167 ; Caldwell v.
Parmer, 56 Ala. 405; Dupuy v. Leavenworth, 17 Cal. 262; Drewry v. Montgomery, 28 Ark. 256 ; Lowe v. Lowe, 13
Bush 688; Galbraith v. Gedge, 16 B.
Mon. 633; Foster v. Barnes, 81 Penn.
377; Williamson v. Fontain, 7 Baxter
212; Beecher V. Stevens, 43 Conn. 587 ;
Rammelsberg v. Mitchell, 29 Ohio. St.
22 ; Hogle v. Lowe, 12 Nev. 286;
Arnold v. Wainwright, 6 Minn. 358;
Faulds v. Yates, 57 Ill. 416; Hewitt v.
Rankin, 41 Iowa 35; Roberts v. McCarty, 9 Ind. 16. Atlaw, however, the
title is vested in the several partners as
tenants in common: Wood v. Montgomery, 60 Ala. 500.
11. The weight of authority seems to
be in favor of the proposition that partners cannot claim an individual exemption in the partnership property, the property having been levied upon for a debt
of the firm before the claim to an exemption was asserted: 1ond v. Kimball, 101
Mass. 105; Billingsley v. Spencer, 64
Mo. 355; Gaylord v. mnof, 26 Ohio
St. 317 ; Guptil v. McFee, 9 Kans. 30 ;
Giovanni v. First Nat. Bank of Montgomery, 55 Ala. 307, overruling 50
Ala. 47, and Id. 251 ; also, 51 Ala. 177 ;
In re Handlin, 3 Dillon 290 ; Bonsall v.
Comly, 44 Penn. St. 442, 447 ; Wise v.
Frey, 7 Neb. 134; Russell v. Lennon,
39 Wis. 570; Love v. Blair, Sup. Ct.
of Indiana, MAarch 1881. See Harrisv.
Visscher, 57 Ga. 229, 231. Per contra:
Stewart v. Brown, 37 N. Y. 350; Radcliff v. Wood, 25 Barb. 52 ; In re Young,
3 Bank Reg. 440 ; In re Rupp, 4 Id. 95;

In re McKerclier, 8 Id. 409.
(a) In North Carolina, it is held that
a partner is entitled to an exemption out
of the partnership property, provided all
the partners assent thereto : Burns v.
Harris, 67 N. C. 140.
(b) In Wise v. Frey, 7 Nab. 134, a
distinction is taken, and the opinion is
expressed that when the judgment was
against the partner in his individual ca-
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pacity, he would be entitled to claim his
exemption out of his share of the partnerslip effects. See Servanti v. Lusk,
43 Cal. 238; Newton v. Howe, 29 Wis.
536.

(c) A homestead cannot be carved out
of partnership property: Terry v. Berry,
13 Nevada 515.
12. In equity, partnership debts are
joint and several: grisham v. Lippincntt, I Stock. (N. J.) 354; Tillyaw v.
Laverty, 3 Fla. 72; Strong v. Niles, 45
Coun. 52 ; Haralsonv. Campbell, 63 Ala.
278 ; Kent v. Wells, 21 Ark. 411 ; Silverman v. Chase, 90 Ill. 37 ; Freemanv.
Stewart, 41 Miss. 138 ; Irby v. Graham,
46 Miss. 427 ; Hilliker v. Francisco, 65
Mo. 604.
13. Upon the death of one of the partners, the survivor is entitled to the possession of the partnership assets, which
he holds in trust for the payment of the
partnership debts: Robertshaw v. Hanway, 52 Miss. 713; Bassett v. .[iller,
39 Mich. 133; Mfiller v. Jones, 39 Ill.
54; Shields v. Fuller, 4 Wis. 102 ; Wilson v. Soper, 13 B. Monr. 517 ; Glass
ice v. Hicks,
v. Ludlum, 8 Kans. 48;
14 Fla. 565; Costley v. Wilkerson, 49
Ala. 210 : Strange v. Graham, 56 Ala.
614; Hanna v. Wray, 77 Penn. St. 27.
(a) If the surviving partner does not
account within a reasonable time, equity
will enjoin him from acting and appoint
a receiver : Nelson v. Hayner, 66 Ill.
487.
(b) The surviving partner is not entitled to any compensation for winding
up the business of the firm and attending
to the payment of its debts: Gyger's
Appeal, 62 Penn. St. 73; Brown v.
McFarland,41 Id. 129 ; Piper v. Smith,
1 Head 93.
(c) He is entitled to give a preference
to a particular creditor of the firm as
against the other creditors of the firm:
Wilson v. Soper, 13 B. Mlonr. 417;
Loeschigk v. Hatfield, 51 N. Y. 660;
Roach v. Brannon, 57 Miss. 500, where
it is said: "He is the legal owner of the

entire assets, and a firm creditor who has
received nothing, has no more right to
complain that some other bonafide firm
creditor has been paid in full, than the
individual creditor of an ordinary person would have under the same circumstances."
14. The earlier cases held that there
must be an insolvency of the surviving
partner, before a partnership creditor
could reach the estate of the deceased
partner for the payment of his debt:
Cowell v. Sikes, 2 Russ. 191 ; Campbell
v. Mlullett, 2 Swaust. 574 ; Exparte Kendall, 17 Vesey 514 ; Pendleton v. Phelps,
4 Day (Conn.) 481; Alsop v. Mather,
8 Conn. 587.
But it has been subsequently laid down
that the creditor can elect to proceed
against the estate of the deceased partner, without regard to the state of the
firm assets: Devaynes v. Noble, 1 Meriv.
529 ; Wilkinson v. Henderson, I Myl. &
K. 582; Freeman v. Stewart, 41 Miss.
138; .ason v. Tiffany, 45 Ill. 392;
Silverman v. Chase, 90 Ill. 37 ; Fllyau
v. Laverty, 3 Fla. 72; Camp v. Grant,
21 Conn. 41.
In New York, the rule is that the
creditor must show an inability to collect
his debt from the surviving partner:
Voorhis v. Childs, 17 N. Y. 354 ; Richter
v. Poppenhausen, 42 N. Y. 373 ; Ppe
v. Cole, 55 N. Y. 126.
15. The effect of the bankruptcy of
one co-partner is to dissolve the firm, and
to render the solvent members of the
firm and the assignee of the bankrupt
tenants in common of -the partnership
effects: Halsey v. Norton, 45 Miss. 703.
Hence the rule is, that after one member of a firm has been adjudged a bankrupt, and has executed an assignment to
his assignee, the solvent partner and such
assignee must join in an action to collect
a claim due to the firm : Graham v. Robilson, 2 Durn. & East 282; Eckhardt
v. Wilson, 8 Id. 140; Browning v.
Browning, 29 N. Y. (Supt. Ct.) 547.
16. A discharge in bankruptcy of one
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member of a firm under proceedings
giving no schedule of partnership debts
or assets, and not praying for a discharge
from such liabilities, does not relieve the
bankrupt from liability for partnership
debts: Poillon v. Lawrence, 77 N. Y.
207; Corey v. Perry, 67 Me. 140;
Lindsey v. Corkery, 29 Gratt. 650.
17. It has been held that where one
partner turns over the assets of the firm
to his co-partner, and retires, the continuing partner assuming and agreeing to
pay all the debts, and creditors are notified of such arrangement, the liability of
the retiring partner is changed from that
of a principal to that of a surety, and
he is released from all liability if the
creditor grants an extension of time to
the principal without the assent of the
surety: Smith v. Shelden, 35 Mich. 42;
s. c. 16 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 292 ;
Millerd v. Thorn, 56 N. Y. 402 ; Harris
v. Lindsay, 4 Wash. C. C. 271. See
McNeal's Adm'r v. Blackburn, 7 Dana
170 ; Stonev. Chamberlain, 20 Geo. 259 ;
Oakeley v. Pashell, 4 C. & Fin. 207;
s. c. 10 Bligh's New Parl. R. 548;
Evans v. Drummond, 4 Esp. 90; Conwell v. McCowan, 81 Ill. 286. Percontra: Maingay v. Lewis, Irish R. Com.
Law 495 (1869).
The doctrine does not apply, of course,
where the creditor expressly reserves his
right against the other partner: Bedford
v. Deakin, 2 B. & Ald. 210.
In Colgrove v. Tallman, 67 N. Y. 85,
it was held that where the joint creditor
had knowledge that one partner had assumed the delts, and where he was requested by the retiring partner to collect
his claim and neglected to do so, the
principal thereafter becoming insolvent,
the retiring partner was thereby discharged.
18. A release of one of two p rtners
with a proviso that it should not prejudice releasor's claim against the other
partner, does not discharge the latter :
Solby v. Forbes, 6 E. C. L. R. 11;
Thompson v. Lack, 54 Id. 540; Green-

waldv. Kaster, 85 Penn. St. 46. In this
last case it is said: "The rule that a
release of one joint obligor or promissor
operates as a release of his co-obligors
or promissors has long been confined to
technical releases, and these by means of
recitals may be limited to one alone."
19. As partnership creditors have a
preference over individual creditors on
the partnership assets, the question arises
whether the individual creditors have a
like preference on the separate estate.
There has been a difference of opinion
upon this question. In some cases the
right has been doubted and in others expressly denied: Wisham v. Lippincott, I
Stock. (N. J.) 353 ; Morris v. Morris, 4
Gratt. 293; Higgins v. Rector, 47 Tex.
361 ; Cleghorn v. Ins. Bank of Columbus,
9 Ga. 319 ;" Camp v. Grant, 21 Conn.
41, 60; Bardwell v. Perry, 19 Vermont
292.
But the general rule ie that announced
in the particular case, that firm creditors
have in equity a prior claim upon the
partnership property, and the separate
creditors a like preference upon the separate property, with a right in the creditors of one class to share in any surplus
which may remain after the creditors of
the other class have been satisfied. This
rule is sustained by the great weight of
authority: Toombs v. Hill, 28 Ga. 371 ;
Thornton v. Bussey, 27 Id. 302 ; Matlock
v. Matlock, 5 Ind. 403; Holland v. Fuller, 13 Id. 195; Union Nat. Bank v.
Bank qf Commerce, 94 Ill. 271 ; .Rainey
v. Nance, 54 Ill. 209 ; Mliorrisonv. Kurtz,
15 Id. 196 ; Ladd v. Griswold, 4 Gilm.
25 ; Gillaspy v. Peck, 46 Iowa 462;
MCulloh v. Ddshiell, 1 H. & Gill
99 ; Irby v. Graham, 46 Aiss. 427 ;
Kirby v. Shoonmaker, 3 Barb. Ch. 49;
Wilder v. Keder, 3 Paige 167 ; Morgan
v. Slcidmore, 55 Barb. 263; In the
Matter of 1ieser, 26 N. Y. (Sup. Ct.)
202; .odgersv. Meranda, 7 Ohio St. 179;
Brock v. Bateman, 25 Ohio St. 609;
,McCormack'sAppeal, 55 Penn. St. 252;
Black's Appeal, 44 Id. 503; Penning.
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ton v. Bell, 4 Sneed. 200; Jackson
Iis. Co. v. Partee, 9 Heisk. 298; Tillitlqhast v. Champlin, 4 U. I. 173, 190;
RVoddrop v. Prike, 3 Dess. 207 ; hall v.
Hall, 2 McCord's Oh. 302 ; South Boston
Iron Co. v. Holmes, 4 Cliff. 343 ; Murrill
v. Neill, 8 How. (U. S.) 414. The
New Jersey cases, in support of the rule,
are collected in the particular case. The
principle was established in Massachusetts by statute in 1838. See HIowe v.
Lawrence, 9 Cush. 5.55. In Kentucky,
the rule is not adopted in its entirety,
but the principle there laid down by the
courts is that the per cent. derived from
the firm assets should be ascertained, and
individual creditors to the same extent
should be allowed an exclusive compensation out ofindividual assets, and that then
an equal pro rata should be allowed to
both: Northern Bank v. Keizer, 2 Duval 169 ; WIhitehead v. Chadwell, 2 Id.
432. The right of individual creditors
to a preference on the individual or separate estate is also asserted in Holton v.
Holton, 40 N. I. 77 ; Bowker v. Smith,
48 Id. 120; Miller v. Clarke, 37 Iowa
325 ; .3oline Co. v. Webster, 26 111. 233.
parBut that the rule laid down in tile
ticular case does not apply where there is
no joint fund and no solvent partner,
beems to be equally well settled: Ex
parte Sadler, 15 Vesey 52; Janson's
Case, 3 Madd. 229; Peake's Case, 2
Rose 54 and note; Pahlman v. Graves,
26 Ill.
405 ; Brock v. Bateman, 25 Ohio
St. 609; s. c., 15 Am. Law Reg. (N.
S.) 214; Smith v. .M1allory, 24 Ala.
628 ; Daniel v. Townsend, 21 Ga. 155 ;
Higgins v. Rector, 47 Texas 361; In
re Downing, 2 Dillon 136 ; Ianre Knight,
2 Bissell 518; In re 1cEwen, 6 Id. 294.
But the Massachusetts court in Howe v.
Lawrence, 9 Cush. 555, says that under
the statute tie rule is applicable in that
state even though there is no joint estate
and no silent partner. In Veyer T.
'horburgh, 15 Ind. 124, the rule was
also said to be applicable even though
there were no joint assets.

20. Partnership goods may, however,
be levied upon to satisfy the separate
debt of one of the partners: lVeaver v.
Ashcroft, 50 Texas 427 ; White v. Woodward, 8 B. Mon. 485.
(a) The sheriff should levy on the
interest of that partner in the partnership estate, he may also take possession
of the entire property, and if he only sells
the interest of the partner against whom
the judgment was rendered, he is not
liable in damages to the other partner:
Clark v. Cushing, 52 Cal. 617 ; Davis
v. White, 1 Houston 228 ; Moore v.
Sample, 3 Ala. 319 ; Stevens v. Stevens,
39 Conn. 474, 480; Saunders v. Bartlett, 12 Heisk. 316; Newhall v. Buckingham, 14 I1. 405 ; Moore v. Pennell, 52
Me. 162 ; Atkins v. Sxton, 77 N.Y. 195.
(b) But if the sheriff, instead of levying
on the debtor's interest, levies upon and
seizes the partnerslip property as the
sole property of the debtor partner, he
becomes a trespasser, and is liable as
such: Atkins v. Saxton, 77 N. Y. 195.
(c) One purchasing at sheriff's sale
the interest of one partner in the partnership property, does not acquire a right
superior to the rights of the copartner or
of the joint-creditors, but lie takes whatever interest remains in the debtor partner after the payment of the partnership
debts: Chandler v. Lincoln, 52 111. 74;
Rainey v. Nance, 54 Id. 29; Ross v.
Henderson, 77 N. C. 173; Doe v. Hunt,
11 Ired. 42 ; Andrews v. Keith, 34 Ala.
722 ; Wilson v. Strobach, 59 Id. 492;
Donnellan v. Hardy, 57 Ind. 393.
(d) The right of one so purchasing is
the right to an accounting and to share in
the surplus belonging to the debtor partner: Aforss v. Gleason, 64 N. Y. 204.
21.
Vhere judgment is recovered
against one partner on his individual
debt, and execution issues, a levy being
made on his interest in the partnership,
but before the sale executions issue
against the same property on judgments
against the firm for firm debts, the latter
executions have priority: Ryder v. Gil-
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bert, 23 N. Y. (Sup. Ct.) 164; Eighth
Nat. Bank v. Thch, 49 Id. 595; Minor
v. Perce, 38 Vt. 610 ; Coover's Appeal,
29 Penn. St. 9 ; Trowbridge v. Cushman,
24 Pick. 310.
(a) And an attachment of partnership
property for a partnership debt, prevails
over a prior attachment of the same
property for the separate debt of one of
the partners: Pierce v. Jackson, 6 Mass.
242; Fargo 4, Co. v. Ames, 45 Iowa
492; Cox v. Russell, 44 Id. 560; Howell v. Commercial Bank, 5 Bush 101;
O'Bannon v. Miller, 4 Id. 25.
(b) But it has been held that, where
in a suit against copartners the separate
property of either partner is attached,
the lien thus acquired is not discharged
or impaired by the subsequent attachment of the same property by the separate creditor of the same partner: Allen
v. Wells, 22 Pick. 450; Newman v.
Bagley, 16 Id. 570; Stevens v. Perry,
113 Mass. 380. A contrary view has
been taken of the matter in New Hampshire. See Jarvis v. Brooks, 23 N. H.
136 ; Crockett v. Crain, 33 Id. 550.
(c) The preference which the law
gives the creditors of a partnership will
be protected in proceedings of garnishment by firm and individual creditors :
Switzer v. Smith, 35 Iowa 269. In
heedy v. Second Nat. Bank, 62 Mo. 17,
it is held that, in attachment against an
individual a person is not liable to garnishment who is indebted to the firm of
which he is a member.
22. A firm debt cannot be set off
against a debt due from one of the partners: Houston v. Brown, 23 Ark. 333;
Sager v. Tupper, 38 Mich. 258; Wel
v. Jones, 70 Mo. 560. In Chamberlain
v. Stewart, 6 Dana 32, it is held that
partners may set off a debt due to the
firm by an insolvent debtor against one
due to the latter by one of the partners. In Johnson v. Kaiser, 40 N. J.
Law 286, it is held that a surviving
partner in an action against himself to
recover a debt which he individually in-

curred, may set off a claim due to the
firm. In Jones v. Blair, 57 Ala. 458,
it is held that a firm debt cannot be set
off against a debt due from one of the
partners, even with the consent of his copartners, as a set off to be available must
be owned by the defendant in his own
absolute right at the time suit was
brought.
23. And an individual debt cannot be
set off against a debt due to the firm:
Harlow v. Rosser, 28 Ga. 219 ; Collier
v. Dyer, 27 Ark. 478; Meeker v.
Thompson, 43 Conn. 77. In Mtontz v.
Morris, 89 Penn. St. 392, it is held,
however, that such off-set may be allowed with the consent of copartners.
24. A new partner is not liable for
the debts of the old firm, unless be expressly agrees to assume them: Shamburg v. Ruggles, 83 Penn. St. 148;
Kountz v. Holthouse, 85 Id. 235 ; Fagan
v. Long, 30 Mlo. 222; Gauss v. Bobbs,
18 Kans. 504; Piano Co. v. Bernard, 2
B. J. Lea 358 ; Parmalee v. Wiggenhorn, 6 Neb. 322.
25. A retiring partner is liable, in
absence of actual notice, to those who
have had prior dealings with the firm.
Holtgreve v. Wintker, 85 Ill. 470:
Haynes v. Carter, 12 Heisk. 7; Austin
v. Holland, 69 N. Y. 571 ; Howell v.
Adams, 68 Id. 314; Kenney v. Altvater,
77 Penn. St. 34; Polk v. Oliver, 56
Miss. 566; Dickinson v. Dickinson, 25
Gratt. 321; Kennedy v. Bohannon, 11 B.
Mon. 119; Lovejoy v. Spafford, 93 U.
S. 430.
26. The common law did not admit
of partnerships with restricted liability,
and statutes authorizing limited partnerships must be substantially complied with,
or those who associate under st, will be
liable as general partners: Van Ingen v.
Whitman, 62 N. Y. 513; Smith v. Argall, 6 Hill 479 ; s. c., 3 Denio 435 ;
Bowen v. Argall, 24 Wend. 496; Richardson v. Hogg, 38 Penn. St. 153;
Andrews v. Schott, 10 Id. 47 ; Henkel v.
Heyman, 91 Ill. 101.
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ALLERTON v. CITY OF CHICAGO

ET AL.

United States Circuit Court, Northern District of Illinois.
HENRY R.ALLERTON v. CITY OF CHICAGO AND CHICAGO CITY
RAILWAY CO.
The police power is inherent in a municipal corporation, and cannot be transferred.
Power to "regulate the management" of a business includes the power to require
a license for carrying it on.
Under a statute authorizing a city to license hackmen, omnibus drivers, "and
others pursuing like occupations," the city has the power to require street railway
companies to take out licenses for their cars.

The distinction between the taxing and the police power discussed by DRUMMOND,

J.

SUR demurrer to bill in equity.

The council of the city of Chicago passed an ordinance requiring the companies which operated street cars for the conveyance of
passengers upon any lines of horse or city railway within the city
of Chicago, to obtain a license in the month of April, of each year,
and pay for the same the sum of fifty dollars for each car operated
or run. A penalty was imposed for failing or refusing to take out
a license. The company obtaining the license was required to
place conspicuously in every car so operated and run in the city, a
certificate signed by the city clerk, and giving the number of the
car, and stating that a license had been obtained, and that the
necessary fee had been paid; and a penalty was also imposed for
a failure to post or keep such certificate in the car.
The plaintiff, a stockholder in the Chicago City Railway Company, filed this bill to enjoin the payment of the license fee required by the ordinance. The defendants demurred.
ifitchcocc, Dupee & Judah, 0. Beckwith and Goudy, Chandler
Skinner, for plaintiff.
B1. S. Tuthill and A. S. Bradley, for the defendants.
DRuMMOND, Circuit Judge.-The only question in the case is,

whether the ordinance in question is valid.
operating street cars in the city of Chicago,
to construct their railways and operate them,
which have been from time to time passed;
VOL. XXIX.-60

Several corporations
have been authorized
by various ordinances
and these ordinances
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have been recognised and affirmed, many of them by the legislature of the state. By virtue of these ordinances and acts of the
legislature, the companies have the right to run their cars for the
transit of passengers through the city. It cannot be said, therefore, that the effect of the ordinance which has been specially
referred to, although it is called a license, would be to give the
companies the privilege of running their cars. That they have by
virtue of the ordinance and the acts of the legislature. There
can be no doubt that the legislature would have the right, under
the Constitution of 1848, which was in force when the franchise
was granted, to tax the corporations for the use of their franchise.
That is a tax which is entirely independent of the value of the
cars, tracks and other tangible property of the corporations, and
so treated by the Constitutions of 1848 and 1870. But there are
many difficulties with this branch of the subject. There are certain conditions required by the Constitution of 1870 as pre-requisites to the imposition of a tax of this kind, even conceding that
the legislature has authorized the city to impose the tax, and I,
therefore, without giving any decided opinion upon that part of
the case, prefer to place my decision upon another ground, and to
sustain the ordinance as a regulation of the police power of the
city. This is always a subsisting power which it is generally held
cannot be transferred by the city, but is inherent in its municipal
organization. There can be no controversy about the power of the
city over many things connected with the operation of the city
railways. Admitting that because of the price of fare agreed upon
there can be no change in that, yet by virtue of its police power, the
city can, to a great extent, regulate the running of the cars, prescribe rules and laws as to speed, stoppage and other things connected with the operation of the railway. This has not been
questioned by the counsel of the plaintiff; but it is claimed this
cannot be considered a police regulation, because it is manifestly
the exercise of the taxing power of the city. It is argued that
the price of the license is so large that the intent is manifest. It
rs very difficult to lay down any absolute rule upon this subject,
and to hold that a particular sum may be within the police power
of the city, and another sum beyond the power, and a mere tax.
By the general law of 1872, for the incorporation of cities and
villages in this state, it is provided that the city council in cities
shall have authority to license hackmen, draymen, omnibus drivers,
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and
cabmen. expressmen, and all others pursuing like occupations,
as
intended
to prescribe their compensation. This was obviously
the
to
relation
conferring a police power upon the city council in
that has
various classes named in the statute. This is a power
literally, canbeen uniformly exercised, and construing the statute
does not include
not well be questioned. But it is claimed that it
like any
the street railway, because it is not pursuing an occupation
of those named.
even the same
Omnibuses may be licensed. They may pass over
may carry
they
and
railways,
streets as those occupied by the horse
can
which
distinction
only
passengers in the same manner. The
that
is
occupation,
of
be called substantial between the two classes
one carriage goes upon iron rails, in a regular track, with wheels,
ordinary street
and the other carriage goes with wheels upon the
way.
these street
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that
and there can
railway carriages are of a like nature as omnibuses,
a license
be no doubt, I think, of the right of the city to demand
which may
from all omnibus drivers, and to include every omnibus
the
require
to
and
corporation,
or
belong to a particular company
and
owned
so
be
may
that
omnibus
such
payment of a license for
used.
v.
The Court of Appeals of New York, in the case of Mayor
ordinance
an
that
held
261,
Second Avenue Railroad, 32 N. Y.
of the city of New York, in many respects like this, was invalid,
the
as an attempt, through color of a license, to impose a tax upon
police
the
of
railroad company, refusing to treat it as an exercise
license
power of the city. The price charged in that case for the
was the same as in this.
v. City
In the case of .Frankford PhiladelphiaPassengerCo.
the license fee was the
qf Philadelphia,58 Penn. St. 119, where
St. 445, the Supreme
Penn.
60
same, and Johnson v. Philadelphia,
such an ordinance,
of
Court of Pennsylvania took a different view
such seems to be
and
and treated it as a police regulation merely;
the case of the
in
the view of the Supreme Court of this state,
88 IlU. 221.
Chicago,
Chicago Packing Provision Co. v. City of
City
In the case of Prankford & PhiladelphiaPassenger Co. v.
license
the
of Philadelphia,the city obtained its power to impose
city of
from a statute substantially similar to that under which the
Act of
Chicago claims the power in this case. In that case the
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the legislature declared that the City Council of Philadelphia
should have authority to provide for the proper regulation of omnibuses, or vehicles in the nature thereof, and to this end "it shall
be lawful for the council to provide for the issuing of licenses to
such and so many persons as may apply to keep and use omnibuses,
or vehicles in the nature thereof, and to charge a reasonable annual
or other sum therefor." In that statute, the words " vehicles in
the nature thereof;" in this, the words "pursuing a like occupation" are used. I cannot see that there is any substantial distinction in that respect between the two statutes.
In the case in 88 Illinois, already referred to, the corporation
was organized and doing business under the laws of this state. A
question arose in that case as to the power of the city to issue a
license. It was denied, in the argument of the case, that the power
existed, but the Supreme Court held that under the power "to
regulate the management" of the business, the city had the right
to issue a license, and to prescribe the compensation. That was
also under the same law, the Act of 1872, which conferred power
upon cities to grant licenses, and regulate omnibus drivers, and all
others pursuing a like occupation, and to prescribe their compensation. The Supreme Court of this state decides in that case that
the power to require a license is one of the means of regulating
the exercise of a pursuit or business ; that there are other means
that might be adopted to accomplish the purpose, but that these
municipal authorities are not restricted as to the means that they
shall employ to regulate the business; and various authorities are
cited by the court in support of the view which they take; and
they repeat the ruling which had been previously made that a
license was not, in the constitutional sense of the term, a tax.
The Supreme Court must also have considered and passed upon
a question which has been discussed in this case, namely: whether
or not the act which gave the authority to the city to license, was a
general law under the constitution of this state; and they held that
it was, and that it was intended to apply to all cities which might
adopt it.
It is true that was a case of licensing a business which was generally admitted to be injurious in its character to those near the
place where it was carried on; but it was a question of power, and
the point in controversy was whether the city of Chicago had the
right to exercise the power of licensing. The license fee demanded
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in that case was one hundred dollars. It seems to me that the
question involved in this case arose substantially in that, and it
was decided by the Supreme Court of the state that it was a valid
exercise of the power to regulate a particular business. That is
also the view taken by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the
cases referred to.
In view of these decisions and of several decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States within the last few years (Alunn v.
Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, and others), I think the weight of authority
is in favor of regarding this as a police regulation.
One of the difficulties I have had with the case, has been whether
it ought not to be regarded as a tax for revenue under the form of
a license. It may be conceded that the argument is strong for
treating it as a revenue measure; but as I before stated, there are
some objections which I consider very weighty, and which would
prevent me at this time from placing the decision on that ground.
It may be admitted that, viewing it as a police regulation requiring
the payment of a fee for the license, in amount it goes to the very
verge of the exercise of police power; but as other courts have
held that such a tax did not exceed that limit, I cannot hold that
it does in this case; and, therefore, I shall, as at present advised,
sustain the ordinance in question as a valid exercise of the police
power of the city council.
There have been some arguments used by counsel which, I think,
do not properly apply to the pleadings. It is insisted that the
court must construe this as a tax, and not a mere police regulation.
It is admitted that the Court of Appeals of New York did construe a similar license fee as a tax. The Supreme Court of Pennit to be a
sylvania has given a different construction, and held
police regulation. There is nothing in the bill by which the court
can regard it absolutely as the exercise of the taxing power of the
city. There is nothing in the bill which would authorize the court
to hold, if it were a tax, that it was in violation of the Constitution
of 1870, as not being uniform upon the particular class on which
it operates. It is urged that it cannot be treated as a tax, because,
if so, it would not be within this requisition of the Constitution of
1870, because the street railways come in direct competition with
some of the steam railways; as that of the Illinois Central and
the North-Western to Hyde Park and Evanston. There is nothing
in the pleadings which would warrant the court in considering these
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facts, unless the court should take judicial notice that they do thus
come in competition, without any allegation in the pleadings.
Under the authorities, and upon the statements contained in the
pleadings, the court cannot necessarily construe this as a tax. The
court is at liberty, I think, to construe it as a police regulation.
These views have been given for the purpose of enabling the
parties, if they desire, to take the case to the Supreme Court of
the United States. The District Judge who heard the application
for an injunction in the first instance, and granted it, is inclined
to hold, as I understand, that this was not the proper exercise of
the police power. I hold, for the purpose of deciding the case,
that it is ; and if the case is to be determined by the pleadings as
they at present stand, it can be certified up to the Supreme Court
as upon a division of opinion between the judges. If, however,
the counsel desire to raise some of the questions which have been
discussed in the argument, I think it would be advisable for them
to amend the bill, and if they wish, leave will be granted for that
purpose.
I.

MAY

STREET

CAR COMPANIES BE

REQUIRED TO PROCURE A LICENSE?

' In Iowa it was held that the grant of
an exclusive right by city ordinance to
a street railway company, to construct,
operate, and maintain over the streets of
the city a street railway for the carriage
of passengers, containing no provision
in relation to the payment of a fee or
license, did not exempt the company from
paying a license fee, provided by a prior
ordinance to be paid by all persons engaged in carrying passengers: State v.
Herod, 29 Iowa 123. This case is,
however, distinguishable from the principal case in this: the ordinance requiring the license was passed before and
was in force at the time when the street
car company was chartered, while in the
latter case, the company was chartered
before the license ordinance was passed.
It is not conceived, however, that this
makes any difference, since the charter
cannot give immunity from police regalation: 2"tArpe v. Rutland 4- B. Ruilroad C ., 27 Vt. 149.

In Frankford,4-c., Co. v. Philadelphia,
58 Penn. St. 119, it was held that corporations chartered to do business in a
city are to be regarded as inhabitants of
the city, and, unless exempted, are subject to its ordinances ; that a grant to a
corporation to carry passengers in cars
over the streets of a city does not necessarily involve exemption from liability
to municipal regulation, the right is
neither greater nor less than a natural
person possesses ; that when a corporation is authorized to carry on a specified
business within a municipal corporation,
it is intended that the business shall be
conducted under the restrictions which
govern others transacting the same business ; that liability to restrictions is involved in the designation of t22 place
where the corporation's business is to be
carried on ; that a reasonable regulation
of a privilege is not a denial of the right
to exercise it ; and that an ordinance of
Philadelphia requiring passenger cars to
be numbered and to be licensed on paying a stipulated sum for each car is a
valid police regulation. And in affirm-
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ance of these views, see Johnson v.
Piladelpkia,60 Penn. St. 445.
Apparently in conflict with these cases,
is that of The Mayor 4-c.
of New York v.
Second Are. lailroadC'o., 32 N. Y. 261,
in which the railway companies were required to pay a fed to the mayor and to
receive in return a license or certificate
that tile money had been paid. The ordinance imposed no duties to be observed
by the companies or their servants, but
tile single act of paying the money. "It
prescribes," said the court, "no regulations in regard to the size, dimensions,
comfort and cleanliness of the cars, the
speed at which the same siall be run, the
manner of receiving and discharging passengers, their numbers and names, and
the stations at which they shall stop.
Regulations of police are regulations of
internal or domestic government, forbidding some things and enjoining the performanee of others for the security and
protection, and to promote tile happiness
of the governed."
The collection of
revenue appeared to be the only object
ot the ordinance. It was therefore not
a police regulation.
The court does not deny that a police
regl'ation of street railway companies
may be made. On tile
contrary, quite
the reverse is implied. Nor is it denied
that a license may be required to be pro-

The cases seem therefore to sustain
the authority of a municipality to ordain,
as a police regulation, that street car
companies shall take out licenses for their
cars. But whether or not a city may require a street car company so to do de
pends upon its charter. In the two
Pennsylvania cases power was conferred
upon the city "to provide for the proper
regulation of omnibuses, or vehicles in
tie nature thereof," and the court held
tilis applied to "passenger railway cars.
They are omnibuses, or if not, they are
vehicles in the nature of omnibuses :"
Frankford, &-c., Co. v. Philadelphia, 58
Penn. St. 119, 125 ; Johnson v. Piladelphia, 60 Id. 445. The Illinois statute
confers upon the city of Chicago power to
license "omnibus drivers," &c., " and
all others pursuing like occupations."
This would seem broad enough to warrant the licensure of street railway companies.
II.

WHAT MAY STREET

CAR COeMPA-

NIES BE CIIARGED FOR A LIcENsE ?

A municipal or other government,
having power to issue and to require a
license to be taken out, may charge fot
it a fee sufficient to cover tile
expenses
of issuance and registration. All tile
license cases are agreed as to this.
Some cases go further and hold that a
cured, as a police regulation. The defee exceeding the cost of issuing and
cision is only that an ordinance requiring registering the license may be charged,
a license to be procured for rerenue and on the ground that the license confers a
not for police purposes is invalid. Tile special privilege or franchise for which
conflict, therefore, is only apparent; and the fee is only a price proper to be paid
the ease is also in harmony with the for it. Such a case is Chilersv. People,
rule laid down in Johnson v. Philadelphia, 11 Mich. 43, where the license conferred
supra, that if a municipal regulation be the privilege of running a ferry from
adopted which would be lawful if in- Detroit to Windsor, across the Detroit
tended for one purpose, and unlawful if river.
for anothtr, the presumption is that the
And a license fee may be imposed as a
purpose was lawful unless the contrary means to restrain the carrying on of a
clearly appear. In the New York case business or the keeping of property,
the "unlawful purpose" of the ordi- where to carry on such business or to keep
nance, viz : the collection of revenue did such property to an unlimited extent.
C clearly appear ;" indeed, it was the
would injuriously affect the health, safety
only purpose that appeared at aUl.
or welfare of society. Thus, the sale of
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intoxicating liquors may be so restrained:
tate v. Cassiday, 22 Minn. 312; those
who have not the means with which to
purchase a license being debarred from
engaging in the business; and in Wisconsin a dog license fee exceeding the
cost of issuance and registration was
justified as a proper exercise of police
power, the court holding that the legislature might impose such sums for
licenses as would operate as a partial
restriction upon the business or upon
the keeping of the particular kinds of
property regulated: Tenney v. Long, 16
Wis. 566; and Carter v. Dow, 16 Id.
299.
It is difficult, therefore, to see any
reason why, if in order to relieve overcrowded streets, it be necessary to reduce the number of cars being run, or
to preclude an increase of their number,
a license may not be required to be procared at a cost which shall operate a partial restraint upon the business. Judge
SHAsSWOOD was evidently of opinion

ity extra and especial expense. Persone
engaging in such business or occupation
ought, therefore, to indemnify the mu.
nicipality for the extra expense caused
by them, and this, it is held, warrants
the imposition of a license fee reasonably
sufficient to pay for it.
Thus in Cincinnativ. Bryson, 15 Ohio
625, a fee of $3 was held authorized to
be charged for a license to run a dray,
and the court said : " It is manifest to
every one, that in a large city vehicles of
this description cause great destruction
to the public ways; far greater than the
usual ordinary travel of citizens otherwise employed. There is, therefore, no
injustice in exacting a reasonable portion of the expenses which such special
occupations cause to the community ; and
those who enjoy the special privilege,
can refuse to bear a reasonable portion
of the burden but with an ill grace.
* ** The employment gives the drayman or hackman special privileges, which
he enjoys to the prejudice of the city,
in the injury necessarily done to her
streets and pavements, to an amount far
greater than any benefit to be derived
from the price of the license, excluding
the necessary burden of supervision."
And in Cincinnati v. Buckcingham, 10
Ohio 257, an ordinance that no person
should be licensed or permitted to occupy
any place in the market, but upon making
payment of twenty-five cents, for every
market-day and occupation, was held
valid. "The open spaces for the accommodation of the more transient frequent-

that a charge for street car licenses sufficient to effect this purpose was proper,
for he says: "In the case before us it
may be allowable to conjecture that the
principal object of requiring the license
was to place some check upon the number
of cars employed on the road, so that
the streets might not be unduly obstructed
and their passage by the citizens at large
interfered with and prevented. If the
sum charged was more than sufficient for
this or any other proper object of police
regulation, then indeed a question might
the
arise as to whether it was not in effect a ers of the market * * * demand
tax on the franchise :" Johnson v. Phila- interposition of the city authorities to
prepare, pave and keep them clean, to
delphia, 60 Penn. St. 445, 450.
order and
A number of cases justify the imposi- arrange the stands, preserve
see Kip v.
But
rules."
the
enforce
of
cost
the
exceeding
fee
a
license
tion of
J. L. 298.
issuance and registration, and reason Paterson, 26 N.
The Supreme Court of Michigan,
thus: The business or occupation sought
to be licensed requires extra supervision CutpBELL, J., dissenting, held that a
and care from the city authorities; or, it fee of $5, required for a license to keep
uses and injures the public property to a stall to sell fresh meats outside the
an extent greater than ordinary employ- public markets was not a tax but a
reasonable compensation which the city
ments, and thus occasions the municipal.
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of Detroit may demand from those who
will not sell in the public markets, for

issuing the license, and besides for the
additional labor of its officers, and expense thereby imposed. If, said the
court, the vending of meats and vegetables be carried on elsewhere than at the
public market, "the city may require the
liceise and the bond, for protection and
regulation; and may require such reasonable fee as will compensate either partially
or fully for the additional expense of
inspection and regulation thereby incurred. * * * If it be conceded that
the city may demand a sum sufficient to
defray the expense of making out the
license, it is difficult to conceive why it
may not also demand enough to pay all
the expense attending the supervision of
the trade at the place licensed." Ash v.
People, 11 Mich. 347.
In Boston v. Schajfer, 9 Pick. 415, it
was held that the city might require the
proprietor of a theatre to take out a license and pay therefor $1000; that this
fee was not a tax but of the nature of
an excise on a particular employment.
"There can, therefore," said the court,
"be no objection to it in the present case
admitting theatrical entertainments to be
as meritorious as other occupations.
But it seems to be peculiarly proper in
employments of this kind. They require
to be watched. Towns are put to expense inpreserving order, and it is proper
that they should be indemnified for inconveniences or injuries occasioned by employments of this nature." And see
Kitson v. Jlayor, 4-c., of Ann Arbor, 26
Mich. 325, 327.
In Baker v. Cincinnati,11 Ohio St.534,
the city charged $63.50 for a license to
give theatrical performances, and it was
held not to have been illegally exacted.
The court said: "We think the power to
prohibit certain things to be done, unless
a license be obtained, and to charge for
stich license, in many instances of its
exercise, stands on the same principle as
an assessment. An assessment stands on
VOL. XXIX.61
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the principle of benefit to property; a
charge for a license may be made in view
of the special inconvenience and expense
to the government, for the benefit of the
individual who asks for the license.
Things licensed may be such as should
only be permitted under the regulation
or supervision of public functionaries.
The tax or charge may have reference
to such regulation and supervision.
Such is the case of exhibitors of shows
and performances. An inquiry has to
be made as to the character of those,who
propose to exhibit, and as to the nature of
the thing to be exhibited. Then the exhibition may require additional attention
from those intrusted with the care of the
public peace, to prevent disorder and disturbance. The burden thuis devolved on
public officials, requiring, perhaps, as
increase in their number or compensation, for the benefit of exhibitors of
shows or performances, may justly authorize a charge beyond the mere expense of filling up a blank license. The
same principle that would authorize a
charge for the one extends to the other.
To say that it is a tax, and goes into the
treasury, does not disprove this object:"
Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio St. 543.
As to whether license is a tax or not, com.
pare this case with Mlays v. Cincinnati,
1 Ohio St. 268, and see Cincinnati G.
L. 4- C. Co. v. State, 18 Ohio St. 242.
In Van Baalen v. People, 40 Mich.
258, pawnbrokers were required by ordinance to take out a license, and it was
held that the business of pawnbroking
gave rise to heavy city expense, especially in the increase of police duty and
supervision which it necessitated ; that the
sum charged for the license ($200) did
not greatly exceed the incidental and
conseqnential expense of issuing the license, and therefore the ordinance was
held valid.
And in Chicago Packing Company v.
Chicago, 88 Ill.221, it was held that
packing-house proprietors doing busines
within one mile of the urban limits
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might, by ordinance of the city, be required to take out a license and to pay
for it $100. The packing company had
in this case taken out a license required
to be procured by the town within whose
limits it actually did business. "Nor
does the fact," say the court, "that appellant is liable to pay a fee to each
municipality for the privilege of pursuing
a vocation the General Assembly regards of such a character as to require
regulation and control, militate against
the grant or exercise of the power" to
regulate and control such establishments
by requiring them to take out and pay
for a license. And see St. Paul v. Colter, 12 Alinn. 41.
The two Pennsylvania cases cited,
supra, affirm the validity of an ordinance
of the city of Philadelphia, requiring
the street car companies to take out a
license at $50 per car; but the weight of
these cases as authority upon the point
under discussion, is somewhat reduced
by the fact that in neither case was the
reasonableness of the fee passed upon.
That question was not before the court,
and it expressly refrained from giving an
opinion upon it. See opinion of SaLnswooD, J., in Johnson v. Philadelphia,60

Penn. St. 450.
Nor is .3ayv. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St.
268, in conflict with these views. In
that case, hucksters were required by
ordinance to take out a license each
year. One did so four successive
years, and paid for the four licenses $95,
and $4 fees for issuance. This money
he then sought to recover on the ground
that the ordinance requiring its payment
was ultra vires and void. The legislature had, by an especial enactment,
denied to the city of Cincinnati power
"to levy any tax-* * * orothe charge"
upon persons bringing provisions to the
market, and this was the primary ground
upon which the ordinance was declared
invalid. "The law," said the court,
"exempts every person bringing pro-visions to the market * -* *-from any
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charge whatever." The court held that
revenue and not the prevention of huckstering was the object of the ordinance,
and that it was not a police regulation,
since it was for another than police purposes. It is conceded that where revenue and not regulation is the object of
the licensure, it is not valid as an exercise of police power. This was the case
in Mayor, 4-c., o] New York v. Second
Avenue Railroad Co., supra.
But in Mayor v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137,
a city. ordinance required bakers to take
out a license at an expense of $50, and
the court said that it was "inclined to
doubt the propriety of that portion of
the by-law * * * which requires 820 to
be paid as a license, unless the latter can
be supported under the taxing power of
the corporation." But this is a mere
dictum, for the court had already denied
the validity of the by-law on other and
different grounds. The weight of authority is clearly against this position.
The case, however, suggests the objection most frequently made to charging
these license fees, namely, that they are
taxes, and as such cannot be laid by the
municipality.
However, they are not taxes. The
object for which taxes are levied and
that for which these fees are charged are
different. Revenue is the object of taxation, regulation that of licensure, and it
matters not that the license fee is payable into the treasury, that does not make
it a tax: Frant:ford, 4-c., Railroad Co.
v. Philadelphia.58 Penn. St. 119; Johnson v. Philadelphia, 60 Id. 445; State
v. Herod, 29 Iowa 143; Louisville Central Railroad Co. v. Louisville, 4 Bush
478; People v. Thurber, 13 Ill. 554;
292 ;
East St. Louis v. Wlehrung, 46 Ill.
St. Paul v. Colter, 12 Minn. 51; Rochester v. Upnan, 19 Id. 108.
So long as the fee charged is one
reasonably calculated to effect the object
sought, the licensure is valid as an exercise of police power, and is not invalid
as a tax. But if the fee be unreasonable
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and more than sufficient to effect the
regulative purpose, it is a tax, and as
such, is unauthorized and uncollcctable,
unless the corporation has power to impose it for revenue purposes: State v.
Roberts, II Gill & J. 506; .fay5 v.
Cincinnati, I Ohio St. 268; Cincinnati
v. Bryson, 15 Ohio 625 ; Freeholders v.
Barber, 7 N. J. L. 64 ; Kip v. Paterson,
26 Id. 298; Bennett v. Birmingham,
31 Penn. St. 15 ; Cononwealthv. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562; Chilvers v. People, 11
Mich. 43; Mayor v. Ytille, 3 Ala. 137 ;
Johnson v. Philadelphia, 60 Penn. St.
ierod, 29 Iowa 123;
451; State v.
Mayor V. Second Avenue Railroad Co.,
32 N. Y. 261 ; Home v. Ins. Co. v. Augusta, 50 Ga. 530. But courts will not
closely scrutinize a license fee with a
view to adjudge it a tax, where it does
not appear unreasonable in amount, in
view of its purpose as a regulation.
Courts will not review municipal discretion in imposing license fees where it has
"The subject" (i. e.
not been abused.

what sum shall be charged), said GRAVES,
J., " will not admit of nice calculation,
and it would be futile to require anything
VIan Baalen v. Pkople,
of the kind :"
40 Mich. 258 ; Ash Y. People, 11 Mich.
347 ; Johnson v. Philadelphia, 60 Penn.
St. 451 ; Burlington v. Putnam Ins. Co.,
31 Iowa 102.
Undoubtedly, street cars require especial police service. Extra officers are
required to see that the cars do not obstruct the street crossings, and to see
that vehicles do not delay or hinder the
cars.
They are required to preserve
order, and to prevent theft and other
crime likely to be committed in the
crowded cars, and to arrest persons disorderly thereon or otherwise offending.
It would be difficult to demonstrate
that $50 per car is an unreasonable fee to
charge for these extra services, and, if it
be reasonable, the ordinance requiring
the license to be taken out and the fee to
be paid is valid.
ADELiERT HAtILTON.
Chicago, March 9th, 1881.

Supreme Court of the United States.
GEORGE B. BLAKE ET AL. EXECUTORS OF G. B. BLAKE, DECEASED V.
JOHN W. McKIM, JUDGE OF THE PROBATE COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF
SUFFOLK, MASSACHUSETTS.

Congress, in determining the jurisdiction ofithe Circuit Courts over controversies
between citizens of different states, has not distinctly provided for the removal,
from a state court, of a suit in which there is a controversy, not wholly between
citizens of different states, and to the full and final determination of which one of
the necessary or indispensable parties, plaintiffs or defendants, seeking the removal,
is a citizen of the same state with one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants against
whom the removal is asked.

IN error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Dis-

trict of Massachusetts.
This was an action upon a probate bond executed by James M.
Howe, as trustee under the will of Henry Todd, with two sureties,
one of whom was the testator of the defendants to recover from
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the estate of the deceased surety the sum of $50,000 for alleged
breaches, upon the part of the trustee, of the bond sued on. The
action was commenced in one of the courts of Massachusetts, by a
citizen of Massachusetts for the use of citizens of that state, against
the executors of George Baty Blake, two of whom are citizens of
Massachusetts and one a citizen of New York.
The executors filed a joint answer, which presented a common
defence, and subsequently, in proper time, filed their joint petition
for the removal of the case into the Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of Massachusetts. The petition was dismissed by the state court. The transcript of the record was,
nevertheless, filed in the Circuit Court. By the latter court the
case, upon motion of plaintiff, was remanded to the state court.
From that order this writ of error was prosecuted.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARLAN, J.-We are of opinion that the case, as made by the
plaintiffs, is not one of which the Circuit Court of the United
States can take jurisdiction.
In the Bemoval Cases, 100 U. S. 468, we had occasion to construe the first clause of the second section of the Act of March
3d 1875, which declares that either party may remove to the Circuit Court for the proper district any suit of a civil nature, at law
or in equity, pending in a state court, where the matter in dispute
exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of $500, and in which
there is "a controversy between citizens of different states." We
held that clause to mean "that when the controversy, about which
a suit in the state court is brought, is between citizens of one or
more states on one side, and citizens of other states on the other
side, either party in the controversy may remove the suit to the
Circuit Court, without regard to the position they occupy in the
pleadings as plaintiffs or defendants ;" that, upon arranging the
parties on opposite sides of the real and substantial dispute, if it
appears that those on one side are all citizens of different states
from those on the othe., the suit may be removed-all those on the
side desiring a removal uniting in the application therefor. In
that case an I6wa corporation represented one side of the dispute,
while the other was represented by citizens of Ohio and Pennsylvania. The controversy was as broad as the suit.
In Barney v. Lathan, decided at the present term, we held (con-
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itruing the second clause of the second section of the Act of March
3d 1875) that one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants, actually
different
interested in a controversy wholly between citizens of
can
them,
between
as
determined
fully
states, and which can be
separthat
which
of
suit
entire
remove from the state court the
preable controversy forms a part, provided it involves the amount
scribed as necessary to federal jurisdiction.
acted
The executors of Blake-each of them having qualified and
the
to
parties
inthe execution of the trust-were all indispensable
Acto
suit: Gould's Pleadings, sect. 73, ch, 4; Dicey on Parties
tions, s. P.322; 1 Chitty Pl. s. P. 52).

They all appeared and

submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. The present case is,
therefore, one in which the suit embraces only one indivisible controversy. It is not wholly between citizens of different states, and
fully determinable as between them, because some of the defendants are citizens of the same state with the plaintiffs.
The contention upon the part of counsel for the executors is,
that the suit is removable upon their joint petition, under the
first clause of the second section of the Act of 1875. We are
unable to concur in that view. There is, undoubtedly, some
ground for such a construction, but we are not satisfied that Congress intended to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts to
the extent that construction would imply. The principal reason
assigned in its support is, that the first clause of the second section
of the Act of 1875 follows the words of the Constitution, when
giving jurisdiction to the Circuit Court of a suit in which there
shall be "a controversy between citizens of different states,"-language which, it is claimed, does not necessarily require that such
controversy must be wholly between citizens of different states.
But that consideration was pressed upon our attention in the Case
of the Sewing Machine Companies, 18 Wall. 553, which arose
under the Act of March 2d 1867. (14 Stat. 558.). That act authorizes the removal of a suit, involving the requisite amount, 'in
which there is a controversy between a citizen of the state in which
the suit is brought, and a citizen of another state,' upon an affidavit by the latter, whether plaintiff or defendant, showing that he
has reason to believe, and does believe, that, from prejudice or local
influence, he would not be able to obtain joustice in the state court,
The argument there, by counsel of recognised learning and ability,
was that a controversy between citizens of different states is none
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the less a controversy between citizens of different states because
others are also parties to it; that to confine the federal jurisdiction
to cases, wherein the controversy is between citizens of different
states exclusively, is to interpolate into the Constitution a word not
placed there by those who ordained it, and one which materially
limits or controls its express provisions. We declined to adopt that
construction of the statute, and held that Congress did not intend
by the Act of 1867 to confer the right of removal where a citizen
of a state, other than that in which the suit is brought, is united,
as plaintiff or defendant in the controversy, with one who is a citizen of the latter state. The construction for which counsel for
plaintiffs in error here contend cannot well be maintained without
overruling the principles announced in the Case of the Sewing
Machine Companies.
It is to be presumed that Congress, in enacting the statute of
1875, had in view as well previous enactments, regulating the
removal of cafises from the state courts, as the decisions of this
court upon them. If it was intended, by that act, to invest the
Circuit Courts with jurisdiction of all controversies between citizens
of different states, although others might be indispensable parties
ther:eto, such intention would have been expressed in language
more explicit than that found in the Act of 1875. We are not
disposed to enlarge that jurisdiction by mere construction. We
are of opinion that Congress, in determining the jurisdiction of
the Circuit Courts over controversies between citizens of different
states, has not distinctly provided for the removal from a state
court, of a suit in which there is a controversy not wholly between
citizens of different states, and to the full or final determination
of which one of the indispensable parties, plaintiffs or defendants,
on the side seeking the removal, is a citizen of the same state with
one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants against whom the removal is asked.
The judgment of the Circuit Court remanding the cause to the
state court is, therefore, affirmed.

